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INTRODUCTION
Background 
It is largely believed that low and fluctuated farm gate prices of cassava in 
Lampung stemmed from the oligopsonistic power of the existing large-scale tapioca-
processing companies. To overcome the problem of low and fluctuated prices of 
cassava, employment, and to improve rural economy, the Provincial Government of 
Lampung initiated the development of Farmer’s Tapioca Processing Units or ITTARA 
(abbreviated from Industri Tepung Tapioka Rakyat). Depending on the sources of 
investment, the ITTARA tapioca processing units is divided into three categories: (a) 
personally financed, (b) financed by private-companies, and (c) financed by local 
government. A unit of ITTARA is an autonomous business unit of a farmers’ cooperative 
or a farmers’ group. 
Presently, almost all ITTARA units financed by local government and several 
ITTARA units financed by private companies collapsed due to managerial incompetence 
and inadequate monitoring and control from the responsible local government 
institutions and from related private companies. By contrast, the majority of personally 
financed ITTARA units are still operating, although they are still depending upon large 
cassava enterprises, particularly in the drying process of tapioca during wet seasons for 
the ITTARA units are not equipped with oven or other drying facilities. 
Having learned such unsatisfactory achievement, the provincial government 
has assigned each district to rehabilitate all ITTARA units in their respective 
administrative authority. It is still believed that the development of small scale-tapioca 
processing units is crucial to improve competitiveness that leads to better prices of 
cassava and, therefore, would help cassava farmers to improve their income. The 
rehabilitation of small-scale tapioca processing units of ITTARA would undoubtedly be 
costly. It entails the costs of reconstruction, selection and training of managers, and 
monitoring and supervision. In addition, proper benefit-cost analysis of the rehabilitation 
                                               
1 Similar version was presented in the Workshop on Rural Prosperity and Secondary Crops Towards 
Applied Pro-poor Reseach and Policies in Asia and the Pacific, UNESCAP-CAPSA, Bogor, Indonesia, 6-9 
December 2005; and in AGRIDIV In-Country Seminar in Thailand, 16 January 2006.
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would also be required. One among many essential aspects of benefit-cost analysis that 
should be scrutinized in relation to economic development and poverty alleviation is the 
effect of such rehabilitation on income and rural employment. 
Research Issues
Lampung is one of the major cassava-producing regions in Indonesia. Many 
tapioca and dried cassava processing firms are operating in the region. These 
processing firms are facing problems of excess capacity in a sense that the total annual 
production of cassava in this region is lower than the total capacity of all processing 
units. If this is true, the price of cassava must be escalated during the periods of lean 
harvest. Yet, secondary data indicates that there is no clear pattern of relationship 
between monthly price and monthly production of cassava. With regard to this situation, 
one may ask question concerning market structure that bring about the unclear pattern 
of such relationship. 
The development of small-scale tapioca processing units (ITTARA) was aimed 
at helping farmers to cope with low and fluctuated prices of cassava by directly linking 
the processing units to local cassava farming and setting up the ratio of cassava price to 
tapioca price. Unfortunately, almost all government financed ITTARA units collapsed, 
while a large proportion of ITTARA units financed by personal funds are able to continue 
operating until recently. The question is: “what factors make such differences?” If the 
factors can be identified, will the provincial or district government plan to continue the 
development of ITTARA units? If yes, what are the sources of funds for the rehabilitation 
of the existing ITTARA units and the development of new ones? What condition should 
be contended by each processing unit or farmers’ groups to be eligible either in a
rehabilitation or development program of new ITTARA units?
Study Objectives 
The objectives of this study are: (1) To analyse the effect of small-scale tapioca 
processing units on financial efficiencies of cassava production, marketing, and 
processing; (2) To analyse the impact of small-scale tapioca processing units on income 
and employment generations in cassava farming, marketing, and processing; (3) To 
identify factors influencing the failure or success of ITTARA units.
RESEARCH METHODS
Analytical Methods 
1. Financial Efficiencies of Cassava Farming, Marketing, and Processing   
In this paper, profitability and benefit-cost ratio are used to measure the 
financial efficiencies of cassava farming, cassava marketing and tapioca processing. 
Each term is clearly defined in tables regarding cost and return in this paper.
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2. Income and Employment Generations in Farming, Marketing, and Processing2      
An important aspect of any government policy that should be analysed is the 
extent to which it may generate income and employment, particularly in a country where 
the proportion of population under poverty line is relatively high. Income generation here 
is defined as the total value of outputs minus the total value of material input3. In other 
words, generated income is nothing but the returns to land, labour, and management in 
all sub-systems of a particular commodity system (see Kawagoe et al., 1990). Income 
generation in a commodity system is simply a summation of incomes generated in the 
three sub-systems (farming, marketing and processing). Since income generation in 
farming is computed at per hectare basis, income generation in marketing or processing 
is also computed for the amount of farm production per hectare.
Technique of analysing employment generation in a commodity system is 
straightforward in a sense that it is just a summation of labours involved in each activity 
of farming, marketing and processing stages. Since the number of labours in farming is 
computed at per hectare basis, the number of labours in marketing or processing is also 
computed for an amount of farm production per hectare when it is marketed or 
processed. 
3. Factors Influencing the Success/ Failure of ITTARA Processing Units 
In this study, the only way to identify the factors is to review available results of 
related studies and to present information gathered from farmers, managers of tapioca 
processing units, officials in the Office of Food Crops and Food Security and the Office 
of Cooperatives, Industry and Trade, and local extension workers.
Research sites and Respondents 
This study is carried out in Rumbia sub-district of Lampung province. Rumbia is 
one of sub-districts where several small-scale tapioca processing unit were established 
since 1997. Two sample villages, Bina Karya and Restu Baru, are selected. The former 
represents ITTARA sites where most of the cassava farmers sell their cassava directly to 
a small tapioca-processing unit that formerly called farmers’ tapioca processing unit 
(ITTARA). The latter represent Non-ITTARA sites where most of cassava farmers sell 
their cassava either through ordinary or tebasan system to middlemen who then 
transport and sell it to large tapioca processing firms (see Figures 1 and 2 in section for 
marketing channels). 
                                               
2  The impacts of small-tapioca processing industry on financial efficiency, income, and employment in this 
study are analysed by comparing two cassava-producing villages that have different scales of tapioca 
processing units (in or outside the sample villages). 
3   Income generation here is equal to value added (see Hall and Taylor, 1986, p.33). 
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Although several cropping patterns exist in each study site, the two study sites 
have one type of cropping pattern in common, which is maize-cassava (see Table 1). 
The study team randomly selected 20 sample farmers from those who adopted such a 
cropping pattern in each site. This was intentionally carried out to eliminate as many 
differences as possible between the sample farmers in the two sites, except differences 
relating to tapioca processing. Other respondents are 3 middlemen in each site, 2 small 
tapioca-processing units (ITTARA) and 2 large tapioca-processing companies. 
Table 1. Estimated Proportion of Area by Cropping Patterns in the Study Sites
Cropping patterns Non-ITTARA site ITTARA site
1. Paddy-Cassava 0 15
2. Cassava-cassava 0 10
3. Maize-maize-vegetables 5 0
4. Maize-cassava* 40 65
5. Paddy-maize 0 5
6. Maize-(Maize+Cassava) 55 5
Total 100 100
Source: Field extension workers’ estimation. 
* The sample cropping-pattern.
ITTARA PROGRAM
Underlying Concept of ITTARA Program
The development of food crop in Lampung put high priority on cassava after 
paddy and maize. Cassava can be used for staple food, raw material for industries, feed 
stuffs, and for export. In this major cassava-producing province, however, cassava 
farmers possess weak bargaining position vis-à-vis middlemen or large tapioca-
processing firms. Moreover, farmers are often unsatisfied with high price-cut imposed by 
the firms in relation to starch content. Their weak bargaining position arises from the fact 
that the distance from their farm to the  tapioca processing units are considered too far 
so they are unable to collect necessary information regarding the price and price-cut 
criteria given by large tapioca-processing units. The majority of cassava farmers obtain 
such information from middlemen who obtain it from the processing unit where they do 
the selling.
ITTARA Program, initiated by provincial government in 1997, aims at 
strengthening farmers’ bargaining position by implementing two major policy measures: 
(1) development of many small-scale tapioca-processing units in cassava producing 
areas so that market would be more competitive, and (2) establishment of cassava price 
support without government financial burden by setting up a particular ratio of cassava 
price to tapioca price (e.g. 9.5%) to prevent farm gate price of cassava from drastically 
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falling. This level of price support was not rigidly determined because it was still 
depending upon the agreement between farmers and ITTARA unit in a respective area. 
The above description may assume that if the ITTARA Program were properly 
implemented, it should be able to shorten marketing channel of cassava because the 
involvement of middlemen would drastically be reduced, and the distance from farmers 
to tapioca processing units would be closer. In such a case, the ITTARA Program would 
increase cassava price through price support and reduction of marketing costs, and in 
turn would improve income of cassava farmers. In addition, many small-scale tapioca-
processing units are also expected to increase employment in the rural area.
Policy Actions Designed to Support the ITTARA Program
To develop small-scale tapioca processing units in Lampung’s cassava 
producing areas, the provincial government carried out several policy actions (Asnawi, 
2002): (1) Selection of locations for the construction of ITTARA units; (2) Selection of 
farmers’ groups to manage the development and operation of ITTARA units; (3) 
Providing farmers’ groups with funds for investment and operation of ITTARA units; (4) 
Encouraging the development of supporting institutions such as Village Unit 
Cooperatives (KUD), ITTARA Cooperatives (KOPITTARA), and ITTARA Marketing 
Cooperatives (KOPASTARA); (5) Carrying out training relating to management of 
ITTARA units, capital, technical matters, marketing, and institutional system; (6) 
Providing guidance for technical aspects and marketing of tapioca; (7) Facilitating 
cooperation between ITTARA units and private company (e.g. Ajinomoto Indonesia Ltd) 
that purchases tapioca product from ITTARA units; (8) Encouraging private company 
(e.g. Bank Muamalat) to participate in developing ITTARA units. 
Current Status of ITTARA and Its Impact on Cassava Price
Long before the implementation of ITTARA Program, the Provincial 
Government of Lampung implemented a policy aimed at solving the problem of low and 
fluctuated prices of cassava. In 1987, the governor of Lampung chaired a committee of 
price agreement. The committee members consist of farmer’s representatives, the 
Associations of Indonesian Feed Exporters (ASPEMTI), and the Association of Tapioca 
Processing Firms (ATTI). It was agreed by the committee that the farm gate price of 
cassava was 13.6 percent of tapioca price or 70 percent of FOB price of dried cassava 
(gaplek). 
Although the agreement brought about the same price level of cassava at the 
processing units, cassava price transmitted to farm gate level were still below the agreed 
price level (Asnawi, 2002). Table 2 indicates that the ratio of cassava price to tapioca 
price was always less than 9.5 percent in the period of 1995-2004. Nevertheless, the 
growth rates of the ratio increased from -7.3 percent per year before ITTARA program 
was in effect to –5.0 percent per year after the program. This condition implies that, to 
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some extent, ITTARA program has positively affected the price of cassava, despite the 
fact that many tapioca-processing units of ITTARA have been bankrupt except the ones 
that are personally funded.
In the ITTARA Program, it was stated in the Governor’s Directive that cassava 
area of each ITTARA unit having the capacity of 5 tons/day was 100 Ha and each 
ITTARA unit were obliged to buy cassava from farmers at Rp85/kg and sold tapioca at 
Rp900/kg. In other words, the ratio of cassava price to tapioca price is around 9.5 
percent. As a matter of fact, Table 2 indicates that this ratio has never been achieved 
even after ITTARA program was in effect. 
Table 2. The Ratio of Cassava Price to Tapioca Price Before and After ITTARA Program in 
Lampung, 1995-2004
Before ITTARA Program was in effect After ITTARA Program was in effect
Year Cassava
(Rp/kg)
Tapioca
(Rp/kg)
Price ratio 
(%)* 
Year Cassava
(Rp/kg)
Tapioca
(Rp/kg)
Price ratio 
(%)*
1995 76 841 9.0 2000 112 1480 7.6
1996 44 586 7.5 2001 153 1763 8.7
1997 62 791 7.8 2002 164 1849 8.9
1998 153 2096 7.3 2003 173 1878 9.2
1999 81 1235 6.6 2004 97 1763 5.5
GR (%/yr) 24.6 32.2 -7.3 GR (%/yr) 1.3/8.7 4.9/7.9 -5.0
Source: Office of Food Crops and Food Security, 
*Ratio of cassava price to tapioca price; GR = Growth Rates (%/yr)
In 1998, a team was assigned to monitor and evaluate the performance of 
ITTARA. It was proposed to develop 152 ITTARA units having the capacity of 2.5 tons of 
tapioca/unit/day with a total investment of Rp 150 million/unit including its working 
capital. To support this policy, Ajinomoto Indonesia Ltd in collaboration with Lampung’s 
Provincial Government, took part in the development of ITTARA (under a Memorandum 
of Understanding, 31 March 1998). Ajinomoto Indonesia Ltd is a company that 
processes tapioca to flavouring products. As the first step, it was planned to build 5 units 
having capacity of 5 tons of tapioca/day, and if it were successful, the number would be 
increased to 40 units with an investment of Rp100 mill/unit. The investment loan would 
be provided to autonomous body in a village cooperative unit (KUD) with 10 years 
instalment, and the processing unit as its collateral (Zakaria, 2000). 
In year 2000, 123 units of ITTARA operated. They are classified into three 
categories: personally financed (47 units), financed by private-companies (6 units), and 
financed by local government (70 units). Presently, almost all local government financed 
units have collapsed due to managerial incompetence and inadequate monitoring as 
well as lack of control from related local government institutions. On the other hand, 
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most of personally financed units of ITTARA are still operating, but they are still 
dependent on large tapioca processing units, particularly in drying tapioca during the wet 
season due to the case that small units are not equipped with oven.
From the demand site of tapioca, ITTARA has a good prospect in a sense that 
tapioca produced by ITTARA and its by-product (onggok) can be marketed to food 
processing in Bogor and various industries in Semarang, Puwokerto, Malang and 
several cities in South Sumatra. Ajinomoto Indonesia Ltd alone needs 300 metric tons of 
tapioca per day to produce seasoning. The company has planned to expand its capacity 
by using 1,000 metric tons of tapioca per day. The company prefers tapioca produced by 
ITTARA units to the one produced by large-tapioca processing firms because ITTARA 
units use solar heat while large tapioca processing firms use oven facilities in drying 
cassava. The nature of tapioca dried under solar heat is easier to develop or outstretch. 
Aside from domestic market, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, European countries, and 
USA are also the prospective markets for tapioca produced by ITTARA (Asnawi, 2002).
Although drying cassava using solar heat results in better quality of tapioca 
than does drying cassava using oven, solar radiation is not always adequately available 
in rainy seasons. Since ITTARA program did not equip small-processing units with oven 
facilities, the present small-processing units have their cassava dried by large-
processing units in rainy seasons. The custom rate of using ovens owned by large-
processing units is around Rp 200 /kg, while the average costs of drying tapioca using 
solar radiation is only Rp 75/kg. This implies that research and development of small-
scale oven that can be used by small-scale tapioca processing units in wet seasons is a 
necessity.   
CASSAVA ECONOMY IN THE STUDY SITES
Cassava Farming
Most farming activity in the study sites consists of two planting seasons, wet 
and dry season. Wet season occurs from October to January with the average monthly 
rainfall about 350 mm. In a normal year, the dry season occurs for three months from 
June to August with an average monthly rainfall of 65 mm. The sample farmers in the 
study sites cultivate dry land only. The sample farmers grow maize in wet season with a 
planting distance of 20x70 cm2. For the second crop season, they grow cassava with a 
planting distance of 80x100 cm2. 
Farmers in the two sites grow cassava in dry season due to the fact that the 
plant is still able to provide moderate returns with relatively low cost. Farmers also 
understand that growing cassava as the only crop may drastically reduce soil fertility. To 
minimize the impact of low soil fertility, farmers use relatively high quantity of organic 
fertilizers as manure and compost.
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Since landless households are hardly found in the study sites, major sources of 
hired labourers are neighbours and adjacent villages. There are apparently two types of 
hiring farm labourers in the study sites; the first arrangement is on daily wage basis, 
while the second is on task basis. In the first type of arrangement, the rates are Rp 
12,500/day for female labourers, Rp15,000/day for male labourers and Rp 25,000/day 
for draught animals. In the second arrangement, the rates are Rp 250,000/ha for land 
preparation using draught animals, Rp 150,000/ha for planting or weeding, and Rp 
200,000/ha for harvesting. Farmers who choose the second arrangement usually tend to 
save their time in supervising labourers such that they have more time to do more non-
farm activities as the source of additional incomes. 
Table 3. The Use of Labours* by Labour Categories in Cassava Production, 2004
Labours categories Non-ITTARA site ITTARA site
1. Male (man days) 62.3 60.6
2. Female (man days) 16.1 28.8
3. Drought animal (animal days)   3.1  8.0
4. Total labours* 81.5 97.4
5. Proportion of family labours (%)    34    55
6. Proportion of male labours (%)    79    68
7. Total paid wages (Rp000)   645  600
Source: Field survey. *Including labours guiding the drought animals. 
Table 3 shows that sample farmers in the ITTARA site employ more family 
labours than hired labours, while the opposite occurs in Non-ITTARA site where the 
sample farmers in the site possess larger average farm size and have more access to 
non-farm employment than do the sample farmers in the ITTARA site. The sample 
farmers in Non-ITTARA site have more access to non-farm employment because the 
site is closer to sub-district centre than is the ITTARA site. Since farm households in 
ITTARA site have limited non-farm activities, they can intensify the use of family 
members in crop production.
In both sites the plant materials of cassava used by farmers in dry season are 
Thailand (80%) and Adira (20%). Farmers in Non-ITTARA site use five types of fertilizers 
for cassava production while farmers in ITTARA site use only three types. Instead of 
using urea and KCl, farmers in ITTARA site use seasoning residue (tetes) and more 
manure in cassava production (Table 4). 
Yield of cassava in Non-ITTARA site is higher than that in ITTARA site because 
the sample farmers in the former use more fertilizers than do sample farmers in the latter 
(see Table 4). Although the yield of cassava in Non-ITTARA site is somewhat higher 
than in the ITTARA site, the production value per hectare in the two study sites are 
almost the same because the sample farmers in ITTARA site receive higher price level 
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of cassava than do the sample farmers in Non-ITTARA site (Table 5). The difference in 
the price level is caused by the fact that farmers in ITTARA site sell their cassava 
directly to the tapioca processing units and, therefore, no middlemen took any profit. The 
reverse is also true in the Non-ITTARA site (see Section cassava marketing for more 
elaboration). 
Table 4. Material Inputs Used in Cassava Production per Hectare in the Study Sites, 2004
Non-ITTARA site ITTARA site
Inputs Unit Quantity Price
 (Rp/unit)
Value 
(Rp000)
Quantity Price 
(Rp/unit)
Value 
(Rp000)
 Plant material Kg   53 5,000 267 77 2,911 225
 Urea Kg 183 1,280 234   0        0    0
 SP-36 Kg   70 1,550 108 14 1,550   21
 KCl Kg   39 2,378   93   0        0    0
 Manure Packs    4 6,000   26 13 5,000   65
 Seas’ng-residue Lt    0       0    0 4,000      91 383
 Herbicides Lt    2    34,211   57 0.62    37,111   23
Total na na na 784 na na 718
Source: Field survey; na=not applicable 
Although the returns to farm household resources in the two study sites are 
almost the same, the benefit-cost ratio in the ITTARA site is higher than that in Non-
ITTARA site. The main reason identified is the costs of both material inputs and labours 
in Non-ITTARA site are higher than in the ITTARA site.
Table 5. Costs and Returns of Cassava Production per Hectare, 2004
Items
Non-ITTARA 
site
ITTARA
site
1. Production (kg) 22530 21010
2. Prices (Rp/kg) 175 185
3. Production values (Rp000) 3943 (100) 3887 (100)
4. Material inputs (Rp000) 784 (20) 718 (18)
5. Paid wages (Rp000)  645 (16)  600 (15)
6. Total costs (Rp000): (4)+(5) 1429 (36) 1318 (34)
7. Returns to household resources (Rp000): (3)-(6) 2514 (64) 2569 (66)
8. Returns to costs ratio (R/C): (3)/(6) 2.76 2.95
9. Generated income (Rp000):(3)-(4) 3159 (80) 3169 (82)
Source: Primary data. Notes: Figures in parentheses are percentages to production values.
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Cassava Marketing 
Cassava farmers sell either fresh or dried cassava (gaplek). However, the 
majority of sample farmers do not sell dried cassava due to low price incentive. For 
example, since weight conversion factor from fresh cassava to dried-cassava is 46 
percent, 100 kg of fresh cassava would become 46 kg of dried cassava. If the price of 
fresh cassava is Rp 175/Kg, the price of dried cassava is then Rp 390/kg. in such a 
case, the incentive for farmers to produce 46 kg of dried cassava out of 100 kg fresh 
cassava is a mere Rp 440, which is (46 x Rp 390)-(100 x Rp 175) or equals to US$0.04 
per 46 kg of dried cassava. Note that, depending on solar radiation, farm households 
need to spend 3-7 days to dry such amount of cassava. 
Figure 1 and 2 describes the marketing channel of cassava from Non ITTARA 
site and from ITTARA site, respectively. These figures show that marketing channel of 
cassava is relatively simple. In Non-ITTARA site, middlemen buy cassava from farmers 
through either tebasan4 system or ordinary transaction. They transport and sell it directly 
to large tapioca processing units. About 80 percent farmers sell their cassava through 
ordinary system, 10 percent through tebasan system, and only about 10 percent of them 
sell their cassava directly to the nearest tapioca processing unit due to the relative 
proximity. 
In the ITTARA site, the majority of farmers directly sell their cassava to the 
small tapioca processing unit due to its proximity. Farmers can sell a small amount of 
cassava (e.g. 50 Kg) to local small processing unit. Only about 5 percent of them sell 
cassava to middlemen who occasionally visited the site in a situation when they cannot 
meet a certain quantity of cassava from other places to transport to large tapioca 
processing units. Most often the prices offered by local small-tapioca processing unit are 
higher than that offered by the middlemen who transport cassava to large tapioca 
processing units. This condition is caused by further distance to the large processing 
than to the local small processing unit. 
                                               
4 In tebasan system, middlemen buy standing crop of cassava from farmers’ field 
Middlemen
Large Tapioca
Processing
Unit
Farmers
Middlemen
(Tebasan System)
 80%
10%
 10%
Figure 1. Marketing Channel of Cassava from non- ITTARA site
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There are 58 active tapioca-processing companies in Lampung. Nonetheless, it 
does not mean that the market is competitive enough since sellers do not know the real 
weighing procedure and the way of determining starch content of cassava. Note that 
when a seller is not satisfied with a price offered by a buyer or a tapioca processing firm, 
it is not easy for a seller to shift to another buyer since it incurs additional transport cost.
In a peak harvest time, a serious problem often arises because middlemen 
have to wait in a long queue in front of the gates of tapioca-processing units. The waiting 
time may deteriorate the quality of cassava and in turn reduce the selling price to tapioca 
producers (see also Pakpahan and Nasution, 1992; Suryana and Daud, 1981). 
It is clear from the above description that the market structure facing cassava 
farmers is oligopsonistic merely because they do not have adequate information 
concerning the way tapioca producers determine cassava price and starch content. 
When a farmer is dissatisfied with price deduction imposed by a processing unit, it is 
unlikely that he/she would go to another processing unit because it would entail 
additional transportation costs. This implies that tapioca producers are the price makers, 
while farmers and middlemen are price takers. 
Table 6 shows that, in the major cassava marketing channel, a middleman in 
Non-ITTARA site pays Rp 35/kg on the average for the cost of a truck service to 
transport cassava from the farms to large tapioca processing units. An additional Rp 
25/kg is required to load and unload. Hence, the middlemen profit is Rp 30/kg. It is 
considered worthwhile to note that processors’ buying price for Non-ITTARA site is 
higher than that for ITTARA site because the middlemen have to get profit.
Because of middlemen’s involvement in Non-ITTARA site, marketing margin in 
this site is higher than that in the ITTARA site. Consequently, marketing efficiency in the 
ITTARA site is higher than that in Non-ITTARA site. This is indicated by the proportion of 
farm gate price in ITTARA site which reached 74 percent of processor’ buying price, 
while in the Non-ITTARA site the number is a mere 66 percent.
Farmers
95%
5 %
Small Tapioca 
Processing Unit
Large Tapioca 
Processing Unit
Figure 2. Marketing Channel of Cassava from ITTARA site
Middlemen
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Table 6. Distribution of Cassava Marketing Margin by the Major Marketing Channels in the Study 
Sites in Lampung, 2004 (Rp/Kg)
Study sites
Non-ITTARA site ITTARA siteMarketing margin and costs
Rp/kg % Rp/kg %
1. Farm gate price 175 66 185 74
2. Processor buying price* 265 100 250 100
3. Marketing margin: (2)-(3) 90 34 65 26
4. Loading/Unloading (ampera) 25 9 30 12
5. Truck /oxcart or bicycle 35 13 35 14
6. Profit: (3)-(4)-(5) 30 11 0 0
7. Benefit/cost ratio: (3)/(4)+(5) 1.50 na na na
8. Generated income: (3)-(5) 55 21 30 10
Source: Primary data; Figures in parentheses are percentages to processors’ prices. See 
Figures 2 and 3 for the major marketing channels. Na=not applicable. 
*After price cut for starch contents (rafaksi). 
Tapioca Processing Industry
Cassava production in Lampung is used primarily for both tapioca processing 
industry and gaplek/chip/pellet processing industry. Discussion in this section, however, 
is only confined to the former because the final users of all cassava produced by the 
sample farmers in this study is tapioca-processing industry. Discussion in this section 
will focus on the tree important aspects of industrial prospects: demand side of tapioca, 
supply side of cassava as raw material for tapioca production, and the profitability of 
tapioca processing industry. 
From the demand side, tapioca-processing industry shows promising due to the 
fact that tapioca is used in many industries such as in food, textile, chemical and 
pharmaceutical industries. By-product of tapioca-processing industry (onggok) is also 
used for feed. Tapioca production in Indonesia increased from 536.7 thousand tons in 
2001 to 629.3 thousand tons in 2002 or increased by 17 percent (Statistic of Medium 
and Large Industries, 2002). Most of cassava production in Lampung is used for 
domestic food industries and only 2.3 percent is exported. Table 7 indicates that export 
demand for tapioca fluctuates but it has a tendency to increase in the future. The export 
demands for dried cassava chips and tapioca have been drastically increasing since 
2004 due to the Free Trade Agreement between Asean and China. 
To describe the supply side of cassava for tapioca processing industry, it is 
worthwhile to scrutinize the relationship between monthly production and monthly prices 
of cassava in Lampung. The relationship is somewhat complicated in a sense that there 
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is no clear and consistent relationship between the two variables (see Figure 3). This is 
also indicated by a weak correlation between monthly production and monthly price of 
cassava in Lampung with a correlation coefficient of –0.1397. 
Table 7. Export of Cassava Products from Lampung Province, 2001-2004
Quantity (tons) Value (000US$)
Products
2001 2002 2003 2004 2001 2002 2003 2004
Dried cassava chips   9,697  9,936  6,686  24,764   582    638  451  3,489
Tapioca 12,809 14,595 13,116 170,541 1,991 2,544  810 30,399
Onggok flour* 19,128 12,874     641        64   871    580     65        8
Source: Office of Cooperatives, Industry and Trade, Lampung Province, Bandar Lampung, 
2004. 
*Onggok is a by-product in tapioca processing.
Fluctuated production and price of cassava certainly affect the management of 
both farming and processing units. Fluctuated price do not encourage farmers to use 
new, high-yield clones with high starch content and, consequently, the productivity level 
of cassava remains low or far below its potential, which is expected to be greater than 30 
tons/ha. For tapioca processing units, high-fluctuated production of cassava to some 
extent creates uncertainty in the supply of raw materials. 
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Figure 3. Monthly Production and monthly prices of cassava in Lampung, 2004
(Source of data: Office of Food crops and Food Security)
Tapioca-processing industry in Lampung is facing a problem of excess capacity 
because cassava production is not only used by tapioca processing industry but also by 
gaplek/chip/pellet processing industry. There are 49 tapioca-processing units and 12 
gaplek/chip/pellet processing units in the area. The annual capacity of tapioca 
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processing units vary from 1,000 to 90,000 tons of tapioca per year, while the capacities 
of gaplek/chip/pellet-processing units range from 10,000 to 150,000 metric tons. The 
total capacity of tapioca-processing units is 1.2 million metric tons of tapioca per year, 
which requires around 6 million metric tons of cassava per year. The total capacity of 
gaplek/chip/pellet-processing units is 1.5 millions metric tons or equivalent to 4.5 million 
tons of cassava per year. Hence, the total amount of cassava needed by the two types 
of processing industry is around 10.5 million metric tons of cassava per year (Office of 
Food crops and Food Security, 2004). Since the total production of cassava is around 5 
million metric tons per year, the two types of industry face an access capacity of 5.5 
million metric tons per year. However, depending on the location of tapioca processing 
units, a few of tapioca-processing units may face excess capacity in particular months 
but excess supply of cassava in other months. 
The aforementioned phenomenon indicates that prices created by the market 
mechanisms of cassava are unable to optimally coordinate marketing process from 
cassava farmers to the processing units. Pakpahan et al. (1992) found that large 
processing units may take great advantage from cassava transaction due to their strong 
networks. Middlemen and truckers may also get more benefit then do farmers because 
middlemen and truckers have better access to information. Consequently, the problem 
of excess supply takes place both monthly and yearly, and the production of dried 
cassava and tapioca is only around 20-50 percent of export quota (500,000 metric tons).
Table 8 shows that a large tapioca processing unit on the average requires
4,500 metric tons of cassava to produce 1,125 metric tons of tapioca, while a small 
tapioca processing unit requires 375 metric tons of cassava to produce 86 metric tons of 
tapioca. This implies that conversion factors from cassava to tapioca in large and small 
tapioca processing units are 0.25 and 0.22, respectively. To produce one ton of tapioca, 
a large and a small tapioca processing units require 1.37 and 11.6 man-days, 
respectively. In the other words, employment opportunity per unit of tapioca in small 
tapioca-processing unit is around 8.5 times as much as that in large tapioca-processing 
unit.
Summarized from Table 8, Table 9 indicates that the share of cassava in total 
return is the highest. Since large tapioca processing units use oven in drying tapioca, the 
share of other inputs (23%) is slightly higher than the share of firm’s profit (22%). 
Conversely, since small tapioca processing units use solar heat in drying tapioca, the 
share of other inputs (8%) is much lower than the share of firms’ profit (30%). 
Although the average wage in Non-ITTARA processing units ought to be higher 
than in the ITTARA processing units, the share of labours in the ITTARA tapioca 
processing units is higher than that in Non-ITTARA tapioca processing units, either in 
absolute term or in relative term. This is because labour coefficient in the ITTARA units 
(0.0212 man-day/kg of tapioca) is much higher than that in Non-ITTARA units (0.0003 
man-day/kg of tapioca). In both absolute and relative terms, the shares of labour, profit, 
and income generation in ITTARA units are higher that in Non-ITTARA units.
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Table 8. Costs Structure, Profit and Income Generation of Large and Small Tapioca Production 
for One Month in Central Lampung, 2004
Non-ITTARA
(Large processing unit)
ITTARA
(Small processing unit)Items Unit
Quantity Price/unit
(Rp000)
Value
(Rp mill)
Quantity Price/unit
(Rp000)
Value
(Rp mill)
1. Output: Tapioca Ton 1125 2150 2418750 86 2000 172500
    By product (onggok) Ton 358 325 116250 27 340 9324
    Total returns    Month 1 na 2535000 na na 181824
2. Raw material (cassava) Ton 4500 265 1192500 375 250 93750
3. Other current inputs: 0
    Diesel fuel Lt 162800 2.3 374440 3750 2.4 9000
    Kerosene Lt 33100 1.2 39720 0 0 0
    Others Month 1 na 113350 1 na 3120
4. Fixed costs Month 1 na 45340 1 na 2930
5. Labourers:
    a. Permanent labourers Mm* 15 6630 99450 6 851 5106
    b. Contract labourers Mm* 47 2500 117500 34 400 13600
6. Profit:(1)-{(2) to (5)} Month 1 na 552700 1 na 54318
7. B/C ratio: (1)/{(1)-(6)} Month 1 na 1.28 1 na 1.43
7. Income generation: (5)+(6) Month 1 na 769650 1 na 73024
Source: Field survey; *Mm=man-months; na=not applicable.
In relation to ecological environment, large-scale tapioca-processing units, 
particularly the large-scale units, create a problem of waste and waste disposal. 
Pakpahan and Nasution (1992) quoted that the industry generated 539,909 metric tons 
of solid waste and 11 million m3 of liquid waste per year in 1987. The waste certainly 
reduces the water quality of local rivers and many of which have been already above 
allowable limit. 
Table 9. Factor Shares of Each Input and Profit in Total Returns for Non-ITTARA and ITTARA 
Tapioca Processing Units per kg of Cassava, 2004
Non-ITTARA
(Large processing unit)
ITTARA
(Small processing unit)Items
Rp/kg %* Rp/kg %*
1. Total returns 563 100 485 100
2. Raw material (cassava) 265 47 250 52
3. Other inputs 127 23  40   8
4. Labours  48   9 50 10
5. Profit:(1)-(2)-(3)-(4) 123 22 145 30
6. Generated income:(4)+(5) 171 30 195 40
Source: This table is simplified from Table 8. 
*Percents in total returns
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Generation of Income and Employment in Cassava Commodity System 
Economic development is but generating income and employment for the 
people in an economy and it is particularly essential in a country where poverty 
incidence is relatively high. It is therefore important that any program or development 
policy be evaluated on the basis of these criteria. For the purpose of this paper, the 
impact of small- scale tapioca processing unit development is analyzed by comparing 
small and large-tapioca processing units in generating income and employment. 
To produce cassava per hectare and then market and process it into tapioca 
generate total income as much as Rp 8.416 in the ITTARA site and Rp 8.252 million in 
Non-ITTARA site. This implies that income generation in the two sites is not significantly 
different. Income generation in the ITTARA site is only 2 percent higher than that in Non-
ITTARA site. Conversely, employment generation in ITTARA is 60 percent higher than 
that in Non-ITTARA site. In the other words, further development of small-scale tapioca 
processing unit would generate significant employment in rural area. 
Output per hectare of any crop generates both employment and income not 
only in farming itself but also in marketing and processing. For cassava commodity 
systems, employment in farming is much higher than in either marketing or processing of 
farm output. It is also true in total income generation but the proportion of income 
generation in farming is lower than the proportion of employment generation in farming. 
Table 10. Income and Employment Generation in Production, Marketing and Processing of 
Cassava Output per Hectare in the Sample sites, 2004
Employment generation
(Man-days)
Income generation
(Rp000)Stages
Non-ITTARA site ITTARA site Non-ITTARA site ITTARA site
Production 82 97 3159 3169
(67) (50) (38) (38)
Marketing 32 42 1239 1156
(26) (21) (15) (14)
Processing 8 56 3853 4091
(7) (29) (47) (49)
Total 122 195 8252 8416
(100) (100) (100) (100)
Source: Computed from Tables 5, 6, and 8; Figures in parentheses are percentages to the totals.
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LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE SURVIVED ITTARA UNITS
Impact of ITTARA Program on Farmers and Local Community
Shorter Marketing Channel and Higher Farm Gate price of Fresh Cassava
Comparison between Figure 2 and Figure 3 in section cassava marketing 
indicates that the ITTARA program may shorten the marketing channel of cassava and 
reduce marketing margin due to disappearing involvement of middlemen. Hence, 
although buying price by tapioca processing unit at the Non-ITTARA site is higher than 
that in ITTARA site, the farm gate price in ITTARA site is higher than that in Non-
ITTARA site (see Table 6).
More Employment Opportunity
Employment generation in the ITTARA site is 60 percent higher than that in 
Non-ITTARA site. In the other words, further development of small-scale tapioca 
processing unit would generate significant employment in the rural area (see Table 10). 
Such significant employment generation would in turn considerably alleviate rural 
poverty.
Better Environmental Quality
So far, the large-scale tapioca processing units in Lampung have negatively 
affected the environment. In 1997, for example, from the total of 62 large-scale tapioca-
processing units, 27 of them had wastewater treatment that met wastewater quality 
standards, 30 of them nearly satisfied the standards, while the remaining 5 units were far 
below the standards. In the ITTARA Program, each unit is equipped with several 
wastewater treatment units and tube wells such that the discharged wastewater satisfies 
quality standards (Asnawi, 2002). 
Factors Determining the Success or Failure of ITTARA Units
Asnawi (2002) found that factors causing the failure of ITTARA units funded by 
the local government are numerous. Some of the factors are: (a) inadequate managerial 
and technical skills of human resources in managing the ITTARA units, (b) Insufficient 
investment capital and working capital, (c) Selections of location and farmers’ groups 
responsible in managing ITTARA units are not properly planned, (d) the amount of 
tapioca produced has not been optimal due to insufficient equipment, (e) weak 
coordination among government institutions in locating ITTARA units, financing, and 
controlling them, (f) inadequate supervision from responsible government institutions 
and private companies that provide financial supports to the development of ITTARA 
units, and (g) many ITTARA units cannot operate optimally because of not having 
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sufficient working capital (see also anonymous, 2000). Unlike ITTARA units funded by 
the government and private companies, most of personally-funded ITTARA units can 
continue operating because they have adequate managerial and technical skills so that 
the establishment and operation of these units are carefully planned even without 
supervision from responsible government institutions (see also Hutagalung, 2000).
MAKING PUBLIC POLICIES WORK EFFECTIVELY FOR RURAL POVERTY 
ALLEVIATION
It has been convincingly demonstrated in this paper that, in terms of benefit-
cost ratio and profit per unit of raw material, the operation of the existing small-scale 
tapioca processing units is financially more efficient than that of the large ones. The 
small-scale tapioca processing units also generate more income and employment than 
do the large ones. This implies that had ITTARA Program been successfully planned 
and implemented, it would have significantly reduced poverty in rural areas. 
Unfortunately, however, many ITTARA units particularly the ones funded by provincial 
government have been collapse due to many constraining factors (see section factors 
determining the success of failure of ITTARA units). 
These constraining factors can be reduced considerably if all individuals 
involved in managing ITTARA units are accountable in a sense that they work in a full 
time basis in managing the ITTARA units under clear ‘rules of the game’ with transparent 
reward and punishment. It is worthwhile to note that local communities in general deem 
government programs encouraging economic activities to reduce rural poverty as 
charities such that accountability of those who are involved in management (e.g. 
management of ITTARA units) is questionable. For example, in several cases of ITTARA 
units, the managers distribute the profit of ITTARA among management staffs without 
considering that a part of the profit should be saved for costs of depreciation, equipment 
parts, and for increasing working capitals. They might expect that the government would 
provide another new fund if they were running out of working capital. By contrast, the 
managers of personally funded ITTARA units work carefully day-to-day to improve 
performance and enhance profit because they are exceptionally concerned with their 
investment.
To avoid such failures of poverty alleviation programs, the government should 
apply participatory approach in all stages (planning, implementation, monitoring and 
control, and evaluation) of the programs. In the case of ITTARA Program, for example, 
all members of farmers’ groups should participate in all stages such that deviations from 
guidelines and objectives of the program can be minimized as far as possible because 
the core notion of participatory approach is nothing but transparency. Participatory 
approach might be more costly than is “centralized approach” because it entails more 
time, budgets, and human resources from government institutions responsible in 
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providing guidance and training for local community, but participatory approach would be 
more effective in achieving the goal of poverty alleviation programs. To rehabilitate the 
collapsed ITTARA units, the government may offer the rehabilitation to local community 
through participatory approach or, if it is unlikely, the government may offer the 
rehabilitation to private companies. 
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